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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a custody matter in which the magistrate court ordered Father
to pay for all of the services of the Parenting Coordinator even though the Parenting
Coordinator took part in actions that:
(1) violated Idaho Code Section 32-717D;
(2) violated Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(1);
(3) were specifically prohibited for any Parenting Coordinator to perform under

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 16(1)(7)(D);
(4) were outside the scope of the order of appointment and any existing order (the
Parenting Coordinator was not given any powers under any order); and
(5) violated the "Parenting Coordinator's oath" (to follow Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 16(1)) that must be signed by each Parenting Coordinator when
applying to the Supreme Court.

BACKGROUNDIFACTS

For purposes of this brief, the Appellant, Frank William Hausladen, Jr., shall be
referred to as "Father", Shari Knoche shall be referred to as "Mother" and the Parenting
Coordinator, John Sahlin, shall be referred to as the "Parenting Coordinator".
An Order Modifying Custody was signed and entered on or about February 2,
2005.' In said order, John Sahlin, Attorney at Law, was appointed to act as the Parenting
Coordinator. The order set forth that the parties shall split the fee of the Parenting
Coordinator equally. The order was silent as to the powers of the Parenting Coordinator

' Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 63.
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and procedures2 required by I.R.C.P. 16(1). To date, no order has been entered by the
magistrate court that modifies the language in the order dated February 2, 2005, as it
applies to the Parenting Coordinator.
In late May, 2005, the Parenting Coordinator was contacted by Mother andlor
Mother's attorney in order to determine "the start of summer" and to "approve" the
summer visitation schedule proposed by

other.^

At some point, the Parenting

Coordinator requested the date the minor child's school would start in August. Father
provided said information to Mother and the Parenting Coordinator in the form of a letter.
After discussing the issue with Mother and Father, the Parenting Coordinator issued a
letter dated June 3,2005, in which he "determined" when summer began for purposes of
the custody schedule and "approved" the Mother's proposed summer ~chedule.~The
Parenting Coordinator's conduct and language in his correspondence indicated that he
was empowered to perform the duties he was exercising.

The appearance of the

Parenting Coordinator's "empowerment" continued through his subsequent conduct and
representations.
In the early summer of 2005, Mother and/or Mother's attorney contacted the
Parenting Coordinator in order to have the Parenting Coordinator decide whether an
outstanding judgment (in favor of Father) relating to attorney fees in an order to show
cause motion had been paid by Mother. The Parenting Coordinator discussed this matter
with both Mother and Father. The Parenting Coordinator issued several letters setting
forth his opinion (but not a recommendation or determination) on the matter in July,
2005.~ Mother "invited" the Parenting Coordinator to address several other issues in
July, 2005.~

In mid-August, 2005, Mother contacted the Parenting Coordinator to determine
the date when thesummer visitation schedule ended and normal visitation resumed.

Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 64.
Exhibit 10 to Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
Exhibit 10 to Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
Exhibits 10 and l l t o Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
Exhibit 11 to Appellant's StatemenffAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
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Mother scheduled "summer" parenting time to overlap into the school year.7 After
discussing the matter with both parties, the Parenting Coordinator made a decision and
advised Father of the decision orally. The parties abided by the oral decision of the
Parenting Coordinator.
On or about August 8, 2005, Father had is first and only conference with the
Parenting ~oordinator.~
The Parenting Coordinator did not describe (orally or in writing)
the role of the Parenting Coordinator. Father and the Parenting Coordinator mostly
discussed the "history"/ background of the case.
In September, 2005, Mother andlor Mother's attorney discussed various matters
with the Parenting Coordinator including but not limited to the outstanding judgment
discussed above, make-up time for parenting time lost when the Parenting Coordinator
"approved" Mother's defective summer schedule after knowing when school started,'
which parent could choose the minor child's school, and whether Father could be forced
to allow the six (6) year old minor child to possess a cell phone provided by Mother.
Even though the Parenting Coordinator knew or should have known that he had no
powers to act, he continued to "investigate" these matters presented by Mother.
The Parenting Coordinator met with Mother and her spouse for one and one-half
(1 %) hours on September 28,2005. On September 29, 20051°, the Parenting Coordinator
filed his first "Order/Recommendation" which deemed a judgment to be "paid in full and
satisfied" and awarded Mother a week of "make-up" parenting time to commence in less
than two (2) weeks from the time the "Order/Recommendationn was filed.
The Parenting Coordinator had not contacted Father regarding any issue since
late August, 2005." Although the Parenting Coordinator spent at least one and one half
(1

%)

hours with Mother and her spouse the day before

issuing the

' Although Father provided the Parenting Coordinator and Mother with the proposed start date for school,

the Parenting Coordinator "approved" Mother's proposed schedule - see Exhibit 10 to Appellant's
StatementiAffidavitin Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.
'Exhibit 9 to Appellant's StaternentiAffidavitin Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.
Exhibit 10 to Appellant's StaternentiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
'O Although the "OrderiRecommendation" was dated by the Parenting Coordinator as "Nov 29" and
completed the certiftcate of service for "Nov 29".
Exhibit 9 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.

"
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"Order/Recommendation", the Parenting Coordinator did not even try to contact Father
for any input prior to issuing the "Order/Recommendation"
The September 29,2005, "Order/Recommendation" states:
The undersigned Parenting Coordinator, having corresponded with
the parties and having read the court file with regard to the issues
discussed herein, and having found the following resolutions to be in
the best interests of the parties' minor child,
hereby
orders/recommends as follows:
1. The Judgement entered September 9, 2004, and modified by the
Order entered November 15, 2004, is deemed paid in full and
satisfied. Petitioner has made various monetary claims against
Respondent outside the scope of any issues presented herefore
before the court, and not necessarily related to any issues
pertinent to this case, and is therefore privileged to present those
claims in another forum or at another time for adjudication.
2. Respondent was entitled to seven (7) weeks of summer visitation
by virtue of the Order Modifying Custody entered on or about
November 29, 2004. Due at least in part to an oversight of the
undersigned Parenting Coordinator, Respondent had only six (6)
summer visitation. In an attempt to compensate
or this missed time with his mother, the undersigned has
determined that Respondent should be allowed on (1) extra
"weekend" (as that term is defined in the aforementioned Order
Modifying Custody), which will occur from October 12 through
October 16,2005.
3. Both oarties have alluded to various oronouncements the court
has made during proceedings in this matter somehow modifying
the court's clear determination in the aforementioned Order
Modifying Custody that the parties share joint legal custody of
The undersigned has found no indication in the court
files herein that the court has entered any order modifying the
order for joint legal custody, and therefore will continue to assume
that determination is the law of the case." (emphasis added)

.

Upon receipt of the Parenting Coordinator's "Order/Recommendation",
Petitioner-Appellant immediately contacted the Parenting Coordinator via telephone and
objected,

requesting

that

the

Parenting

'' Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 76.
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Coordinator

rescind
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misrepresentations of fact relating to a "stipulated" agreement among the parties that was
never stipulated to.
Father filed an amended objectioniappeal to the Parenting Coordinator's
"Orders/Recomrnendations" to correct the misrepresentation of fact contained in the

revised "OrderlRecommendation" and renewed the objections previously filed. The basis
for Fathers objections were as follows:
(1) the Parenting Coordinator was not appointed pursuant to the
requirements of I.R.C.P. 16(1);
(2) the Parenting Coordinator's OrderlRecommendation is beyond
the specific powers of a Parenting Coordinator set forth in the Court's
Order dated February 1,2005;
(3) the Parenting Coordinator's OrderlRecommendation is beyond
the specific powers of a Parenting Coordinator defined in I.R.C.P.
16(l); the Parenting Coordinator did not provide proper notice to
Petitioner andlor allow Petitioner 'an opportunity to be heard' piror
to issuing the OrderlRecommendation:
(4) the Parenting Coordinator's amendment to the original
OrderlRecommendation, contains misstatements of fact, such as:
a. The statement 'having corresponded with the parties with
regard to the issues discussed herein' infers that the parties sent
letters or some other written correspondence when in fact all
communications of Petitioner where over the telephone (with the
exception of the Objections filed with the Court and faxed to the
Parenting Coordinator).
b. The statement 'Based on the agreement of the parties.. .' at
the beginning of the paragraph is a misstatement of fact. Petitioner
was and is only in agreement to the revocation of the prior order.
Petitioner specifically informed the Parenting Coordinator that
Petitioner would object to 'make up time' if the Parenting
Coordinator merely 'rescheduled' the 'make up time' set forth in the
original recommendation.
c. The statement 'The parties have agreed that the make-up
time. .' in the middle of paragraph 2 is a misstatement of fact.
Petitioner agreed only that the Parenting Coordinator revoke the
'make-up time' set forth in October to allow Petitioner time to appeal
the Parenting Coordinator's recommendations.
d.
The Parenting Coordinator's analysislfiudings are
inconsistent with the facts of the case and are not 'in the best interest
of the cl~ild'.'~

-

.
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Exhibit 3 to Appellant's Statement/Affidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.

Appellant's Brief

9

The issues related to Father's objections to the Parenting Coordinator's
"Orders/Recomendations" were heard by the magistrate court on December 7, 2005.
At the hearing, the Parenting Coordinator took part in legal argument against Father's
objections/appeal to the Parenting Coordinator's ~rder/Recommendation.'~ The
magistrate court allowed the legal argument kom the Parenting Coordinator even though
Father objected.I6 At the hearing, the Parenting Coordinator admitted that he lacked
powers to act. The Parenting Coordinator requested the court to enter a new order which
would set forth the powers of the Parenting ~oordiantor.'" The court did not rule on
whether the Parenting Coordinator committed any ultra vires acts.
On December 12, 2005, Father filed a "PetitiodMotion Pursuant to I.R.C.P.
16(1)(9)(B)" in order to terminate the Parenting Coordinator's appointment for cause.'*
Father's petition requested the court to make a specific factual finding of the actions of
the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator and a legal ruling that the Parenting
Coordinator exceeded his mandate, acted in a manner inconsistent with 1R.C.P. 16(1) and
demonstrated bias, all of which are grounds for removal under I.R.C.P. 16(1). In the
alternative, Father requested that the court reconsider the requests made at the December
7,2005, hearing and make a specific finding of fact and a legal ruling on the objections to
the Parenting Coordinator's "Orders/Recommendations" heard by the court on December
7,2005.
At the hearing on December 30, 2005, the trial court "dissolved" the Parenting
Coordinator's appointment since the appointment became another source of dispute
rather than helping the paxties comm~nicate.'~
~lthou~
theh court acknowledged that the
Parenting Coordinator's order of appointment is "very cursory and doesn't really outline
uh, specific authorities, powers, duties, responsibilities and so onmz0the court refused to

IS Pages 6 - 8 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
l6 Pages 6 - 7 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
l7 Pages 20 - 25 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavitin Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case No. 32610, page 80.
I9 Page 56, lines 12 - 21 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Angmentation of Appellate Record.
Page 55, line 25, page 56, lines 1 - 2 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of
Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.

''

Appellant's Brief

10

make a finding that the Parenting Coordinator abused his authorities or his powers.2' At
the end of the hearing, Father reminded the court that his petition specifically asked for a
legal and factual finding of the Parenting Coordinator's actions.22 The court again
refused to make a finding that the Parenting Coordinator exceeded the lawful authority of
any orders.23
The court instructed Father to prepare an order reflecting the court's ruling.
Father prepared an order that accurately reflected the court's ruling.24 The proposed
order set forth a specific account of the evidence taken into consideration by the court at
the time of

and a legal conclusion based on the court's decision at the hearing.

Prior to signing the order, the court "struck" the title of the order, the evidence
considered, the argument considered and the holding discussed at the hearing.26
Although the court ruled at the time of hearing that the Parenting Coordinator did not
exceed his mandate, the co~utrefused to sign an order that stated: the Parenting
Coordinator "has

(emphasis added) acted outside the powers enumerated in the order

dated February 1,2005, nor has he violated I.R.C.P. 16(1). . ."27
After receiving the Order (Hearing on 12-30-05) as modified by the court, Father
timely filed a motion for reconsideration relating to the Petition filed by Father to remove
the Parenting Coordinator for cause pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(1)(9)(~).~~
Father's motion
for reconsideration stated that the order signed by the court failed to rule upon the
petition in question and he requested an order on the merits of the petition, particularly, a
factual finding based on the record andor the Court's file on the case and a legal ruling
" Page 56, lines 5 - 6 and 11 - 12 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StaternentiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
22 Page 61, limes 1 - 12 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
23 Page 61, lines 13 - 15, line 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
24 Pages 38 - 61 of E'uhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
25 Pages 38 - 61 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavitin Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record. - compare with "struck out" language in the order (of Exhibit 4 to Appellant's
StaternentiAffidavitin Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.).
26 Exhibit 4 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
Exhibit 4 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record..
" Exhibit 5 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
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on the elements set forth in the petition.29 At a hearing held on March 1, 2006, Father's
motion for reconsideration was denied.
All in all, after multiple timely requests and at least three (3) hearings, the coud
refused to make a ruling in a written order that the Parenting Coordinator violated an
order, rule or statute AND refused to set forth in a written order that the Parenting
Coordinator DID NOT violate an order, rule or statute.
On May 17, 2006, the Parenting Coordinator filed a "Motion for Order to Show
Cause and for Entry of Judgment and Notice of Hearingn3' which was accompanied by
"Affidavit of John H. Sahlin re: Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of
~udgment."~'The motion requested the court to issue an "Order to Show Cause why
Petitioner herein should not he held in contempt for failure to pay fees of the undersigned

. . . and further moves this court for Entry of Judgment against him a at her]."^' At the
time of hearing, Father set forth objections relating to the Parenting Coordinator's
"Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of Judgment and Notice of d ear in^".^^
Instead of sustaining or overruling the objections, the court unilaterally transformed the
Parenting Coordinator's "Motion for Order to Show Cause and for Entry of Judgment
and Notice of Hearing" into a "Motion to Determine Costs."
The court failed to rule on Father's procedural objections and simply continued
with the court's own "Motion to Determine Costs". Although Father timely objected to
the court's actions, the court simply ignored Father, neither sustained or overruled the
objections, and proceeded with the "Motion to Determine Fees". The court ruled in the
Parenting Coordinator's favor and awarded all fees "charged" by the Parenting
Coordinator hut did not allow any prejudgment interest.

Exhibit 5 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
'O Exhibit 7 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
31 Exhibit 8 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
32 Exhibit 7 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate
Record.
Including but not limited to: the motion and supporting documentation was not in compliance witb the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Idaho law, the motion was procedurally flawed as no order to show
cause bad been issued, and the moving party had no standing to file an order to show cause.
29

"
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The Honorable Charles Hosack, District Judge heard the first appeal and affirmed
the magistrate court's decision. In his holding, Judge Hosack stated something to the
effect of: "I don't think the appellate courts would look kindly on me holding that a
Parenting Coordinator committed ultra vires acts."
On February 26, 2007, Magistrate Judge B a y Watson, entered an "Order of
Voluntary Disqualification". The basis for Judge Watson withdrawing from the case
was: "[ilt appearing to the court that the ends of justice would best be served by another
judge handling the [case]. . ."

Appellant's Brief

ISSUES ON APPEAL

(1) The court-appointed Parent Coordinator took part in actions in violation of:
a. Idaho Code Section 32-717D;
i. Idaho Code Section 32-717D requires any and all powers of the
Parenting Coordinator to be set forth in an order.
ii. Idaho Code Section 32-717D does not allow a Parenting
Coordinator to have any powers "by default".
iii. The language of Idaho Code Section 32-717D is unambiguous and
can not be construed to "infer" a Parenting Coordinator's powers
"by default."
b. the court's order of appointment (including any subsequent order relating
to the Parenting Coordinator);
c. I.R.C.P. 16(1); and/or;
i. Requires any and all powers of the Parenting Coordinator to be set
forth in an order.
ii. Does not allow a Parenting Coordinator to have any powers "by
default".
d. the "Parenting Coordinator's oath" as set forth in the Idaho Supreme
Court's "Application for Registration as a Parenting Coordinator Affidavit
of ~ o m ~ l i a n c e " ~

34 "I have read and understand the contents of 1.R.C.P 16(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, relating to
parenting coordinators in child custody and visitation disputes, and I will provide this service to which I am
appointed in conformance therewith."
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(2) The court-appointed Parenting Coordinator who takes part in actions that violate
the cow's order, I.R.C.P. 16(1), Idaho Code Section 32-717D andlor the
"Parenting Coordinator's oath" is not entitled to payment for his services.
(3) At the hearing on June 5, 2006, the magistrate court committed a reversible error

and/or abused its discretion when it:
a. Did not uphold Petitioner's objections to the motion for order to show
cause filed by the court-appointed former Parenting Coordinator.
b. Did not disqualify itself from hearing the court-appointed former
Parenting Coordinator's motion for order to show cause (motion brought
by court and denied).
c. Unilaterally changed the former Parenting Coordinator's Motion for Order
to Show Cause into a "Motion to Determine Fees."
d. Refused to consider that the acts of the Parenting Coordinator violated the
court's order, Idaho Code Section 32-717D and/or I.R.C.P. 16(1).
e. Issued a judgment in favor of the Parenting Coordinator under an
equitable remedy when an equitable remedy is not appropriate and the
Parenting Coordinator did not have "clean hands".
f. Issued a judgment in favor of the Parenting Coordinator for actions that
were contrary to public policy.

Appellant's Brief

ISSUE (l)(a): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions In Violation of
Idaho Code Section 32-717D
I.C. Section 32-717D(1) requires:

". . .the court may order the appointment of a parenting coordinator
to perform such duties as authorized by the court, consistent with any
controlling judgment or order of a court relating to the child or
children of the parties, and as set forth within the order of
a ~ p o i n t m e n t(emphasis
.~~
added).
LC. Section 32-717D clearly requires that an order from the court set forth any
and all powers of the parenting coordinator. If the order fails to set forth the powers of
the parenting coordinator, the parenting coordinator has no powers. The Idaho code sets
forth no "powers by default" that automatically vest in a parenting coordinator if the
order of appointment is lacking.
In a recent "family law" decision, the Idaho Supreme Court investigated how the
meaning of a statute is to be determined:
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this
Court exercises free review. (cite omitted) The Court must give every
word, clause and sentence effect, if possible. (cite omitted) This Court
must also construe a statute to give effect to the intent of the
legislature. (cite omitted) The legislature's intent is ascertained from
the statutory language and the Court may seek edification from the
statute's legislative history and historical content at enactment. (cite
omitted) In construing a statute, the Supreme Court may examine the
language used, reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and
the policy behind the statutes. Webb v. Webb, 2006 Opinion No. 106
pages 4-5 (1 1129106).
The Idaho Supreme Court also examined this issue in MATTER OF PERMIT
NO. 36-7200, 121 Idaho 819,822-823 (1992):

3i

LC. Section 32-717D(l).
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It is a basic rule of statutory construction that, unless the result is
palpably absurd, we must assume that the legislature means what is
clearly stated in the statute. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254,
805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991); Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968
(1986); State Dep't of Law Enforcement v. One 1955 Willys Jeep, 100
Idaho 150, 595 P.2d 299 (1979). It is also well established that statutes
must be interpreted to mean what the legislature intended the statute
to mean, Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460
(1991); Miller v. State, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Carpenter v.
Twin Falls County, 107 Idaho 575,691 P.2d 1190 (1984), and the statute
must be construed as a whole. Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254,
805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991); Leliefeld v. Johnson, 104 Idaho 357, 659 P.2d
111 (1983); Shenvood & Roberts Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 650
P.2d 677 (1982). Statutory interpretation always begins with an
examination of the literal words of the statute. Local 1494 of the Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters v. Citv of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 586 P.2d
1346 (1978). In so doing, every word, clause and sentence should be
given effect, if possible. Wright v. Willer, 111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179
(1986); Universitv of Utah Hosp. & Medical Center v. Bethke, 101 Idaho
245, 611 P.2d 1030 (1980). The clearly expressed intent of the
legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for
construction where the language of a statute is unambiguous.
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991);
Ottesen ex rel. Edwards v. Board of Comr's of Madison County, 107 Idaho
1099, 695 P.2d 1238 (1985). Finally, when construing a statute, its
words must be given their plain, usual and ordinary meaning.
Shenvood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991);
Walker v. Henslev Trucking, 107 Idaho 572,691 P.2d 1187 (1984).

The Supreme Court further reasoned that a litigant cannot invent or "makeup" an
ambiguity that is not present - conmon sense prevails:
However, ambiguity is not established merely because different
possible interpretations are presented to a court. If this were the case
then all statutes that are the subject of litigation could be considered
ambiguous. As the district court stated:
a statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute
mind can devise more than one interpretation of it.
The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be
preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense that nothing but the
exigency of a hard case and the ingenuity and study of an acute and
powerful intellect would discover.

.. .
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[The] Rule of coustructiou to consider object and purpose has no
place when words of [the] act leave no doubt. John Hancoclc Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 68 Idaho 185, 192, 191 P.2d 359 ( 1 9 4 8 ) . ~ ~

"Finally, when construing a statute, its words must be given their plain, usual and
ordinary meaning." Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254,805 P.2d 452,460 (1991).
The testimony of the Parenting Coordinator at the June 5, 2006, hearing appears37
to suggest that he is automatically vested with certain powers38under I.C. Section 32717D and/or I.R.C.P. 16(1) or he had no powers and the powers exercised by him were
anthorized by the parties.39 In the case at hand, I.C. Section 32-717D is unambiguous
and requires that the order of appointment (or some order from the trial court) MUST
stateiset forth the powers of the Parenting Coordinator. If the court has not set forth the
powersiduties of the Parenting Coordinator, the Parenting Coordinator has no
powersldnties. The "plain, usual and ordinary meaningw4' of LC. Section 32-717D
requires the granting of any powersiduties to a court-appointed Parenting Coordinator to
be in the form of a duly exercised written order from the trial courtlpresiding court.
Therefore, any exercise of a power by a Parenting Coordinator that is not
specifically set forth in a court order is a violation of Idaho Code Section 32-7171). Since
the Parenting Coordinator had no powers to act, the Parenting Coordinator's actions were
ultra vires. If the Parenting Coordinator has not power to act, he is not entitled for
" MATTER OF PERMIT NO. 36-7200 at 823.
" It is difficult to determine with 100% certainty since the Parenting

Coordinator's testimony is comprised
mostly of "I don't recall" and his "answers" to questions under oath are inconsistent andor fail to answer
the question asked (are evasive).
38 At several points in his testimony under oath at the June 5, 2006, hearing, the Parenting Coordinator's
attempts to "argue" that he was exercising powers inferred by 1.R.C.P 16(1) and I.C. Section 32-7171).
However, as the transcript shows, the Parenting Coordinator never explains his reasoning for this
contention and purposely avoids any specifics in his "explaination."
j 9 "Q. I believe we had a phone conversation and it was your opinion that by our actions we authorized you
to do all these actions in this case even though the order didn't specify any powers, is that correct?
A. That's correct." Page 109, lines 5 - 8 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of
Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record..
40 Shewood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254 (1991).
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renumeration for the ultra vires act as the Parenting Coordinator affirms during his sworn
testimony on June 5,2006:

A. I don't recall specifically the sequence of
events, but I can tell you that without an order of
appointment I can't do anything in a case. If I don't
have the authority, I have no reason to act much less
send out a billing.41
ISSUE (l)(b): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions In Violation of The
Court's Order of Appointment
The order that appointed the parenting coordinator fails to set forth any powers or
procedures for the parenting coordinator:
5. The Court further determines that it would be
in the best interest of
hat a parenting
coordinator be appointed in this particular matter.
Pursuant to Idaho Code 32-717(d)~', all expenses
associated with the parenting coordinator shall be split
equally. Pursuant to agreement, the Court hereby
appoints John Sahlin as the parenting coordinator in
this particular matter.43

No subsequent orders of the Court define or set forth the powers of the Parenting
Coordinator. Therefore, the Parenting Coordinator, was appointed to a position by the
trial court but was not "empowered" with any duties. Most importantly, he admitted that
he had no powers from the

4' Page 95, lines 5 - 9 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
42 The reference to I.C. Section 32-717(d) in the order of appointment above is most likely a typographical
error by Richard Kochansky (attorney for the Defendant, Shari Knoche) which was not corrected by Judge
Watson prior to signing the order. I.C. Section 32-717D, not 32-717(d), relates to the Parenting
Coordinator.
43 Clerk's Record Supreme Court No. 32610, Page 63.
Page 8, lines 6 - 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record, which is quoted in the following paragraph and "All the order says,
your Honor, is that I was appointed Parenting Coordinator and the costs are split 50150." Page 5, lines 22 24.
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Although the testimony of at his Order to Show Cause hearing on June 5, 2006,
was most ofien "I don't recall" to most issues, his memory appeared to be very good at a
hearing on December 7, 2005, about the same issues. In fact, the Parent Coordinator
stated:

...

under my order of appointment there's no authority granted to
me, it just says John Sahlin is the parenting coordinator and the costs
split 50150. So I really don't have authority, specific authority, either
under the rule or under the order of appointment to make any - even
a recommendation about4' the satisfaction of this judgment.
So then the question becomes did the parties either tacitly or
explicitly give me the authority to make that decision? And whether
they did or didn't, if I'm not given the authority, can I even make that
decision anyway? And that's a purely legal argument so it doesn't
require my testimony.46

-

All the order says, your Honor, is that I was appointed Parenting
Coordinator and the costs are split 50150.~~
The Parent Coordinator, based on the representations at the December 7, 2007,
hearing, including those cited above, represented to the Court that he no actuaVspecific
powers as Parenting ~oordinator.~'This conclusion is further "backed up" by the Parent
Coordinator's requests that the Court issue an order: ".

. . specifically outlining the scope

of my duties . . .'49; ". . . if I have the scope and ability to deal with. . ."50; ". . .If the

45 The Transcript contained a typographical error and "without" was corrected to "about" pursuant to Judge
Watson's order to correct the transcript (corrected by order - see Clerk's Record for Supreme Court Case
No. 34728, Page 24).
46 Page 8, lines 6 - 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record..
" Page 5, lines 22 - 24 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffdavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
48 Other than powers that may have been conferred upon him by Father andlor Mother which is inferred
from his questiodstatement on page 8, lines 14 - 19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in
Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.
49 Page 20, lines 22 - 23 of Exhibit I to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
Page 21, lines 4 - 5 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemnentiAfiidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
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Court would give me more direction, more authority, more specific authority. . ."5' and
the discussion relating to the drafiing of an order setting forth the powers ofthe Parenting
Coordinator between the Court, the Parenting Coordinator, Mr. Kochansky and

ath her.^^

As stated elsewhere herein, without authority under an order, the Parenting
Coordinator is empowered to do nothing and likewise, cannot collect on ultra vires
services performed.

ISSUE (l)(c): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions In Violation of
I.R.C.P. 16(1)
Idaho Code Section 32-717D(2) states: "Qualification,. selection, appointment,
termination of appointment and prescribed duties and responsibilities of a parenting
coordinator shall be based upon standards and criteria adopted by the Idaho supreme
court." The legislative intentipurpose was to allow the Idaho Supreme Court to further
establish qualifications for the parenting coordinators. 53 I.R.C.P. 16(1) is the rule adopted
by the Supreme Court relating to Parenting Coordinators.
The wording of I.R.C.P. 16(1) mirrors I.C. Section 32-717D(1) requiring that the
order of appointment set forth the dutiesipowers of the Parenting ~ o o r d i n a t o r ~ ~ .

51

Page 21, lines 22 - 23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's Statement/Affi&avil in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
52 Pages 22 - 30 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
53 "This bill establishes consistency and criteria for parenting coordinators in divorce cases in the State of
Idaho. It also gives authority to the Idaho Supreme Court to further establish qualifications for the parenting
coordinators. Parenting coordinators will act to assist parents in developing parenting skills, and to assist
them in collaborative dispute resolution for the best interest of the children." Idaho Session Laws, Chapter
108 of 122, House Bill No. 541.
For example, I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(B) states: "By way of illustration and not limitation the order 9
authorize the Parenting Coordinator to determine such matters as: . . ." (emphasis added); I.R.C.P.
16(1)(5)(C) states: "By way of illustration and not limitation the order may authorize the Parenting
Coordinator to make recommendations to the court on such matters as: . . ."

''
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I.R.C.P. 16(1)(8)(A) also requires5' the procedure to be followed by the Parenting
Coordinator to be included in the order. Obviously, this essential element is also missing
from the order of appointment authored by Mr. Kochansky and signed by Judge

ats son.^^

In the absence of an order from the presiding court that meets the

requirements of LC. Section 32-7171) andlor I.R.C.P. 16(1), the only entity that has
authority to make decisions regarding the case at hand is the trial court. In other words,
the "plain, usual and ordinary meaning"57 of I.C. Section 32-717D and I.R.C.P. 16(1)
require any and all powers of the Parenting Coordinator to be set forth in an order from
the court.
I.R.C.P. 16(1) allows for a Parenting Coordinator to determine58"any other issues
submitted for immediate determination by agreement of the parties."59 However, the
introductory language of 1.R.C.P 16(1)(5)(B) states: "By way of illustration and not
limitation the ovder mav authorize the Parenting Coordinator to determine such matters
as: . .

."

(emphasis added). When reading the rule as it is intended, the Parenting

Coordinator can rule on "other issues submitted for immediate determination by
agreement of the parties"60 i f that power is set forth in the Court's order. This power is
not provided for in any order, therefore, the Parenting Coordinator's actions based on this
theory are ultra virus.

the procedure. . . (emphasis added)
Judge Watson, in his ruling on this matter, agrees that the order has "shortcomings" - see pages 156 line
17 - Page 157 line 8 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record..
Shemood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,254 (1991).
58 Based on the wording of the rule, "determine" (when coupled with subsection @)(A) or 16(1)) appears to
mean in a sense, "order" the parties to do something and said "order" becomes effective when
commnnicated to the parties.
59 I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(C)(ix.).
60 I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(C)(ix.).
" The order appointing the Parenting Coordinator shall specify
56

'"
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In addition, the illustrated powers that a Parenting Coordinator mav be granted
under an order pursuant to 1.R.C.P 16(1)(5)(B) appear to be on issues requiring urgency

and a quick and/or concise "ruling" since "determinations" by the Parenting Coordinator
under this subsection become "effective when communicated to the parties."61 The
Parenting Coordinator filed two (2) written "Orders/Recommendations" which, under the
wording of the rule, would have to be within the purview of LR.C.P 16(1)(5)(C): a
"recommendation" which would become "effective" fourteen (14) days after submission
to the court (under I.R.C.P.l6(l)(S)(A)). The Parenting Coordinator is mixing different
components of l.R.C.P 16(1) in order to "backup" his excuse for exercising powers which
he never had. No matter how you slice it, the Parenting Coordinator had no powers to
act. The Parenting Coordinator cannot now say that it is a simple misinterpretation of the
rule and or statute at issue - he had the opportunity to explain his "view/theory" when he
was under oath at the June 5,2006 hearing. purposefully evaded questions that asked for
his explanation in this area. In addition, the Parenting Coordinator stated that he either
helped or assisted in writing 1.R.C.P 16(1)" which would mean he should be held at a
higher standard than other Parent Coordinators.
Even though 1.R.C.P 16(1) requires that a Parenting Coordinator has to be
"empowered" with the authority in a court's order to determine ". . .other issues
submitted for immediate determination by agreement of the parties."63 (emphasis
added) The Parent Coordinator appears to claim that he received "permission"64 from the

I.R.C.P. 16(1)(8)(A).
117, line 15 and Page 5, lines 15 - 16 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementJAffidavit in Support of
~ o t k for
n Augmentation of Appellate Record.
I.R.C.P. 16(1)(5)(B)(ix.).
64 The Parenting Coordinator contents that the parties agreed to have him settle the disputesiissues that he
ruled upon. At the hearing on June 5, 2006, he appeared to purposely evade specifics regarding this
"permission." When asked if he had anything in writing to evidence said agreement(s) he fmally agreed
6'

62 Page
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parties to rule on certain issues. The plain meaning of the rule also requires "agreement of
the parties" (both Father and Mother) which was not proven at the hearing on this matter.

In addition, it cannot be proven because the Parenting Coordinator was not "empowered"
to issue Orders/Recommendations outside the authority granted by the court. The Parent
Coordinator had no proofievidence (even though he had what appeared to be his "file" for
this case with him while he testified) of any kind65 to show any "agreement" by the
parties to have the Parent Coordinator rule on an issue that he did not already have the
power to (or "appeared to" have the power to) do so. The Parent Coordinator failed to
disclose his "lack of authority" and acted as if he was "empowered" to perform all of the
acts that he did in this case.
Even though the following is moot since 1.R.C.P 16(1) requires a court order to
specify that the Parenting Coordinator can solve issues agreed by the parties, it will
demonstrate just how ridiculous the Parent Coordinator's story is that he was empowered
by agreement of the parties: Another component of having an "agreement" is an

understanding by Father and Mother (the parties involved here) that the Parenting
Coordinator is not already empowered to take the actions that he is. Parties in this
situation can not "tacitly"66 agree to expand a Parenting Coordinator's powers. Parties
can only "expressly"67 agree under these circumstances

if the

Parenting Coordinator

clearly discloses that he is not empowered to perform the action in question

is only

doing so because both parties have agreed to allow the Parenting Coordinator to have
that he did not have anything in writing authorizing him to act outside the scope of his authority (Page 124,
lines 23 - 25 of Exhibit 1 ta Appellant's StatementiAftidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.).
Letters, emails, notes, agreements or anythmg that
66 Page 8, line 15 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
67 Page 8, line 15 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
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additional powers.

The Parent Coordinator did not prove this at the Order to Show

Cause hearing and cannot prove this (since it did not occur).

The Parent Coordinator

and exercised powers as if he lawfully possessed said powers. In essence,

merely

the Parent Coordinator was committing fraud under the guise of a court-appointed official
and is arguing that he should be paid for time spent on the case since Petitioner did not
discover the fraud in time. In other words, the Parent Coordinator's theory is that he is
entitled to payment for services up to the point where the fraud is discovered. The Parent
Coordinator's "theory" simply makes no sense in law or equity.
Whatever the excuse may be for leaving this vital information out of the order,@
if the Parent Coordinator would have reviewed the order of appointment prior to
exercising powers in this case, he would have known that he had no powers. If the Parent
Coordinator would have disclosed this problem, the solution would have been simple:
draft an order, have the parties stipulate to said order and have the presiding judge sign
the order. Instead, it appears that the Parent Coordinator took actions before getting a
copy of the

failed to disclose this vital detail Father and continued to "rule" on

issues as if he was legally empowered to do so. The Parent Coordinator provided no
evidence to the contrary at the hearing even though he was asked numerous questions
asking specifics about why he believed he had any powers to act.

" Richard Kochansky, the

author of the order andlor Judge Watson for signing the order.
Based on the Parenting Coordinator's telephone conversations with Petitioner and the Parenting
Coordinator's evasive answering techniques at the June 5, 2006, hearing - see Page 93 lines 22 - 25, Page
94 - 95, lines 1 - 9 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation
of Appellate Record. NOTE: THE PARENTING COORDINATOR HAS NO DOUBT THAT HE
RECEIVED A COPY OF THE ORDER BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION IN THE CASE, BUT HAS
REALLY NO RECOLLECTION OF ANY OTHER FACTS ON THAT ISSUE.
69
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The problem may be that did not even bother to review the court order until late
August, 2005~', several months after he started exercising powers in this case. In fact,
after the Parent Coordinator knew or should have known that he lacked any powers as the
parenting coordinator, he attempted acts which were outside the scope of any parenting
coordinator's powers.7' I.R.C.P. 16(1)(7)(D) states: "[tlhe Parenting Coordinator may
not malce any modification to any order, judgment or decree; however ihe Parenting
Coordinator may allow the parties to make minor temporary departures from a parenting
plan if authorized by the court to do so. . ." The orderirecommendation of the Parenting
Coordinator dated November 29, 2005, (should be September 29, 2005) deemed an
outstanding judgment against Mother to be paid which is clearly in vioiation of I.R.C.P.
16(1)(7)(D). In addition, the order/recommendation of the Parenting Coordinator took
five (5) days of parenting time from the Petitioner which is clearly in violation of 1.R.C.P
16(l) since the Parenting Coordinator was not authorized by the Court to make such
decisions. The Parent Coordinator did not just "cross over the line" on accident, it
appears that he knowingly and willingly tried to defraud Petitioner under the guise of his
court appointment.
If the conduct of the Parent Coordinator described above was not already
unconscionable, he took the outrageous step to engage in adversarial legal argument
against

Petitioner's

"ObjectionIAppeal

RE:

Parenting

Coordinator

Order/Recommendatiou," On December 7, 2005, at a hearing in which the Parenting
Coordinator was subpeonaed as a witness for Father, the Parenting Coordinator argued

The approximate date on the Parenting Coordinator's billing statement that shows he reviewed the court
file relating to this case.
Order/Recomendation of Parenting Coordinator dated November 29, 2005 (should be September 29,
2005).

O'

''
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that Father's objections to the Parenting Coordinator's recommendations/orders were not
timely and were therefore invalid. The Parenting Coordinator's actions at the December
7, 2005, hearing clearly violate I.R.C.P. 16(1)(7)(B) which states: "[tlhe Parenting
Coordinator has a primary duty to be impartial." This shows that was not an impartial
problem solver but a passionate advocate for Mother, emotionally tied to her views and
desires.

ISSUE (l)(d): The Parenting Coordinator Took Part in Actions that Violated the
"Parenting Coordinator Oath"

The Parenting Coordinator violated the "Parenting Coordinator

when he

violated I.R.C.P. 16(1). At the time he violated his oath, the Parenting Coordinator was
not entitled to renumeration for his services.
In order to receive renumeration as a Parenting Coordinator, must at a minimum,
act in conformance with the oath (and I.R.C.P. 16(1)). Once the oath is violated, no
longer a Parenting Coordinator. Obviously, this issue is intertwined with the previous
section whereas any violation of I.R.C.P. by the Parenting Coordinator in turns, violates
the oath he took to become a Parenting Coordinator.
Once the oath is violatedhreached, the Parenting Coordinator is no longer a
Parenting Coordinator under the law since compliance with I.R.C.P. 16(1) is a conditional
requirement set forth by the Supreme Court. A violation of the oath equates to no
entitlement to payment for the ultra vires services (much like a disbarred attorney suing
for the collection of fees on a case that in which he committed malpractice).
All of the "subissues" set forth herein point in the same direction: when a
Parenting Coordinator performs acts outside the scope of his prescribed boundary,

'' See the Idaho Supreme Court Application for Registration as a Parenting Coordinator Affidavit of
Compliance in which each applicant swears under oath: "I have read and understand the contents of
LR.C.P 16(1), Idaho Rules of Civil Procednre, relating to parenting coordinators in child custody and
visitation disputes, and I will provide this service to which I am appointed in conformance therewith.
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whether it is a statute, rule, order or oath, the Parenting Coordinator is not entitled to
payment for the ultra vires services.

ISSUE (2): A Parenting Coordinator Who Takes Part in Actions that Violate an
Order, I.R.C.P. 16(1), Idaho Code Section 32-717D and/or the "Parenting
Coordinator's Oath" is Not Entitled to Payment for His Services
As analyzed and set forth above, common sense dictates that a person who
violates a court order, rule andlor oath equates with a violation of public policy. The law
does not enforce contracts (or portions thereof) that violate public policy or violate the
law. Idaho Code Section 32-717D and I.R.C.P. 16(1) provide for a court to allocate the
costs and services of the Parenting Coordinator between the parties, it does not allow a
court to overlook all other aspects of the law and allow for the collection of services that
were ultra vires acts. Much as in an agency and/or employment law, the master is not
liable for acts of the servant that were committed outside the scope of employment.
Likewise, Father is not liable for the services performed by the Parenting Coordinator
outside the scope of his authority.

A review of the transcript of the June 5,2006, hearing (an "Order to Show Cause"
motion filed by the Parenting Coordinator against Father) illustrates the Parenting
Coordinator's "testimony" related to the matters discussed in this brief. The Parenting
Coordinator's memory appears to be very good on facts related to him entitled to

II

payment from Father.

The Parenting Coordinator's testimony is very poor andlor

n ~ n e x i s t e n on
t ~ ~facts related to acting outside the scope of his authority or evidence that
would help Father in any way. When compared with the statements the Parenting
73

"I don't recall"
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Coordinator made to the trial court at the December 7, 2005, hearing, it appears the
Parenting Coordinator either has a serious mental condition which entirely deletes his
memory of the recent past or he was purposely misleading the trial court at the June 5,
2006 hearing. The Parenting Coordinator seems to portray himself as an "expert" of the
"workings" of 1.R.C.P 16(1) at the December 7,2005, hearing, but exhibited very limited
knowledge during his testimony at the June 5, 2006 hearing. All in all, the Parenting
Coordinator appears to be purposefully misleading the trail court at the June 5, 2006,
hearing in an attempt to preclude evidence that may disprove his claim and assist Father
in his defense. Based on the Parenting Coordinator's testimony and actions, he should
have received sanctions from the trial court instead of a judgment. No reasonable "trier
of fact" would find the Parenting Coordinator credible as a witness. Therefore, any
weight given to the Parenting Coordinator's testimony and any "evidence" provided by
the Parenting Coordinator, including the documentary evidence, relied upon by the trial
court was an abuse of discretion.
In short, after close examination of the transcript from the hearing, it is very
evident that the Parenting Coordinator's conduct was bad. Taking into consideration that
he is a licensed, practicing attorney with 20+ years of experience, his conduct is simply
outrageous. Taking into consideration that he is also an "extension of the court" by
reason of his appointment as Parenting Coordinator, his conduct is beyond reproach.
On April 3, 2007, approximately sixteen (16) months afier the Parenting
Coordinator's appointment was terminated by the court, the Parenting Coordinator
appeared on behalf of mother as a witness.74 The hearing was for Mother's "Motion for
Appointmentof Guardian Ad Liteflarenting Coordinator/Attomey and/or Motion for
74

Clerk's Record for Case # 34728, Page 67.
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Order Relative to Extracurricular Activities."

Judge Benjamin Simpson, who was

hearing his first motion after appointed to the case, questioned why the former Parenting
Coordinator was present.75

This conduct by the Parenting Coordinator further

demonstrates his demeanor as set forth on prior occasions and explained in this brief

-

revenge and payback against the party appealing his "billings" rather than following the
tenets set forth by the legislature for Parenting Coordinators: "[ble neutral to the dispute
and to the parties."76 Note that Idaho Code Section 32-717D does not indicate nor infer
that the neutrality requirement is dissolved when the Parenting Coordinator's
appointment is terminated.

ISSUE (3): At the Hearing on June 5, 2006, the Magistrate Court Committed a
Reversible Error and/or Abused its Discretion.
As analyzed above, the failure of the magistrate court to follow LC. Section 32717D and I.R.C.P. 16(1) resulted in a reversible error. The failure to follow the law
correctly andlor apply the law as Father requested resulting in reversible error.
The Parenting Coordinator filed an "Order to Show Cause" motion. At the time
of the hearing, Father timely objected on legal and procedural grounds that said motion
was deficient.77 The trial court, in essence, ignored the objections and proceeded without
overruling or sustaining the objections.

The trial court "reformed" the Parenting

Coordinator's "Order to Show Cause" motion and reformed it as a motion to determine
fees over the objections of Father. The former Parenting Coordinator filed an "Order to
NOTE: The Parenting Coordinator was not supeonaed, he voluntarily showed up, apparently free of
charge to testify against Father.
76 Idaho Code Section 32-717D(2)(a).
77 Page 65, line 4 -Page 69, line 6 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
75
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Show Cause" motion which was legally and procedurally deficient, a motion that appears
he has no standing to file as a "nonparty" to the case, and the trial court "resurrects" the
documents as a motion to determine fees. The conduct of the trial court is clearly outside
of Idaho Law and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and equates to an "abuse of
discretion" andior reversible error due to the misapplication of the law.
The trial court also started to

the Parenting Coordinator with proving his

case which Father objected to.79 The trial court asked the witness and moving party (the
Parenting Coordinator) on the stand: (1) "why you're here," (2) "what your request is,"
and (3) "what information you have to substantiate that request."s0 In Father's view, the
trial court was providing legal assistance to the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator
(who is a licensed, practicing attomey) so Father objected. The trial court responded:
The Court: Do you - - do you have a motion to
disqualify me? I - - I'm getting real frustrated, Mr.
Hausladen with this case."
Father responded by stating that as to the particular issue in front of the court, he
would feel more comfortable if another magistrate heard the motion8' (since the judge

78

In Petitioner's opinion it appeared that the trial court was overstepping its bounds and attempting to help
the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator (who was acting Pro Se and is a practicing attomey - someone
who should be completely capable of practicing law on his own).
79
Page 70, line 9 -Page 70, line 5 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenuAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
The trial court later stated: "I'm not - - all's I did is ask him his name and his addre~s."'~However, the
transcript does not lie - review the questions by the trial court to the Parenting Coordinator on lines 19 - 11
on page 70 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record. At the time of the hearing and after reviewing the transcript, it appears that the trial
court was assisting the Parenting Coordinator with proving his case. In addition, towards the end of the
Parenting Coordinator's testimony, the Court asked another question of the Parenting Coordinator that
appears only to assist the court-appointed Parenting Coordinator to meet his burden of proof. (See page
152, lines 16 - 23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenuAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation
of Appellate Record.).
Page 71, lines 3 - 5 of Exhibit 1 lo Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
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presiding over the hearing also appointed the Parenting Coordinator and refused on at
least three (3) prior occasions to rule whether the Parenting Coordinator committed ultra
vires acts).

The trial court then denied what seemed to be its own motion for

disqualification and reasoned:
The Court: Well, as frustrated as I am with this
case, I - - I still think that I can uh, be fair and impartial
in hearing it. I don't think it would be fair to dump this
case on another judge at this point?3
From a reasonable, common sense perspective, how can an individual be fair and
impartial under these circumstances? The trial court was obviously frustrated with what
appeared to be perfectly legal objections raised by the Father. In addition, from Father's
perspective, there appears to be a conflict of interest whereas the judge that appointed the
Parenting Coordinator refused to make a specific factual and legal finding that the
Parenting Coordinator violated the order of appointment and Idaho Law (committed ultra
vires acts)84even though the evidence clearly shows that he did. Although the Parenting
Coordinator is a practicing attorney, the Court appears to be assisting the Parenting
Coordinator with proving his case against Father. On its face, as reflected in the
transcript, the trial court's conduct equates with an "abuse of discretion."
As clearly set forth in the transcript,8' the trial court refused to make a specific
factual finding and a specific legal ruling as requested by Father's motion to remove the
Parenting Coordinator for cause (and denied Father's motion for reconsideration on said
82 Page 14, lines 14 - 16 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
83 Page 73, lines 1 - 4 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
84 See Page 61, lines 1 - 25 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StaternenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
85 See the portion of the transcript relating to the December 7,2005, hearing: Pages 1 - 38 of Exhibit 1 to
Appellant's StatementIAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record..
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issue). Although the evidence needed to make the decision was contained in the case file
(and Father specifically requested the trial court to take judicial notice of said evidence),
the trial court refused:
Mr. Hausladen: Uh, I just got a question on that because I - - I
specifically asked for a legal and factual finding on that uh. I don't
think the Court acknowledged the fact that came in and uh, argued
legal argument against my uh - - my motion on the 7'h of December.
Again, I see this as a uh, issue that's gonna come up later on where
I'm the bad guy filing motions and I don't have any legal basis for
what I file, I've just done this to tie up the legal system. That's not the
case. That's why I'm trying to protect the record and show the actual
legal analysis and factual finding on what did. It's nothing against
personally, it has to do with uh - The Court: Well, I'm not willing to make a finding at this time
with what I have that exceeded uh, the lawful authority of any orders
that he had.
Mr. Hausladen: Not even the fact that he change - - tried to
change a judgment?
The Court: No, I'm not - - I'm not - Mr. Hausladen: Okay.
The Court: - -willing to enter a finding on that. I'm sorry.8"

Although the Father subpoenaed the Parenting Coordinator to show up for the
hearing, the Court supplied sufficient "leverage" against Father to dissuade him from
calling the Parenting Coordinator to the standa7(See Transcript - see also the audio tape
of the hearing which iflustrates the "tone" of the Court). Although the trial court
"dissuaded" the Father from calling the Parenting Coordinator as a witness (and allowing
Father from presenting portions of the Parenting Coordinator's file for the case into
evidence), the trial court freely elicited information from the Parenting Coordinator. In
addition, the trial court reasoned that the testimony of the Parenting Coordinator on the

*'

Page 60 - 61 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's Statement/Aftidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
87Althongh it is not shown in the transcript, Judge Watson's mannerisms and tone of voice at the hearing
send the message: "DO NOT CALL HIM AS A WITNESS OR YOU WILL PAY!"
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facts wouldlcould be viewed as "biased"*' he should not be called as a witness. The
elicitation of this information by the trial court somehow did not do this.

Most

importantly, the Parenting Coordinator took part in legal argument against Father's
Even though
objections to the Parenting Coordinator's "~rdersl~ecommendations".~~
Father objected to the Parenting Coordinator's conduct, the trial court overruled the
objection and allowed the Parenting Coordinator to continue with argument that can only
be viewed as adversarial, not unbiased.
As stated above, the former Parenting Coordinator had no powers to execute in
this case. If the Parenting Coordinator violated the terms of an order andor Idaho Law
andlor the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, he does not come to court with "clean hands"
. .
and is not entitled to equitable remedies. Judge Watson's ruling seems to state that9 0 it
is

not fair that the Parenting Coordinator performed work and does not get paid. It appears
that Judge Watson is using an equitable remedy as the basis for the judgment in this case.
Although the evidence shows many bad acts by the Parenting Coordinator, the Parenting
Coordinator is purposefully evasive on the stand and appears to be withholding
information/evidence and much of the time charged by the Parenting Coordinator came
about because the Parenting Coordinator performed ultra vires acts, the court holds that
the Parenting Coordinator is entitled for payment for all time that he billed for. In fact,
Father was even held liable for the time spent by the Parenting Coordinator arguing
against Father at the December 7, 2005, hearing. In making this holding, Judge Watson

88

The trial court seemed to say that calling the Parenting Coordinator as a witness to elicit factual
testimony would somehow effect his indepence or "nbiased" position as a Parent Coordinator.
89 Page 6 - 7 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for Augmentation of
Appellate Record.
Page 157, lines 9 - 16 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenVAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
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seems to stand for the proposition that an individual appointed by the court is immune
from following Idaho Law and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. No equitable remedy
backs up this ruling.
Judge Watson seems to rule that the only important fact is whether the Parenting
Coordinator undertook "efforts to try to assist the parties in resolving some of their
disputes.""

In addition, Judge Watson stated: "But we're not paying him for being

successful, we're paying him for his time and his efforts."92 It appears that Judge Watson
agrees that the order "was lacking" and the order of appointment (or any order) did not
specify the powers of the Parenting ~oordinator:~(the Parenting Coordinator had no
powers to act) the Parenting Coordinator is still entitled to payment. In essence, Judge
Watson ignored a majority of the evidence, ignored that fact that the Parenting
Coordinator's testimony was very questionable, ignored the law and essentially ruled that
the Parenting Coordinator is entitled to payment no matter what.

This ruling and

reasoning is clearly an "abuse of discretion" andor clearly erroneous.
The magistrate judge's analysis is focused on "reverse engineering"

-

the

Parenting Coordinator did not act outside the scope of his authority because the court
intended for the Parenting Coordinator to have powers to the extent of I.R.C.P.lG(I):

--

When uh when the Court um, entered an order for a parenting
coordinator, um, it was my intention that a separate order be entered
delineating, you know, all of the specific powers and authorities and
the procedures and all of that required under Idaho Code 32-717 D
and 17 (L) of the rules. I didn't - that's not what I got. What
happened is that that order of appointment was just slipped in as a

-

--

91 Page 157, lines 20 - 21 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
92 Page 157, lines 22 -23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
93 Page 157, lines 18-19 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatementiAffidavit in Support of Motion for
Augmentation of Appellate Record.
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it looks like a three-sentence paragraph, paragraph 5, in the order
modifying custody that Mr. Kochansky prepared and that was - wound up being docketed on February 2. So, you know, part of it is
my fault in - - in not requiring uh, you know, a separate order. What
I should have done was crossed out paragraph 5 and required a
separate order with all those specifics put in that. I didn't do that. I
just signed the order. Um, and I think as a result of that we - we've
run into some difficulties.
Um, but that - in my mind that I don't think uh, entitles Mr. uh,
Hausladen to say, well, I don't owe any fees or cost in this thing. Um,
when - -when we do look at uh, uh, Idaho Code 32-717 D, it does uh,
clearly indicate that the Court shall allocate the fees and costs uh,
between the parties, and the Court may enter an order against either
or both parties for the reasonable cost, fees, and disbursements of the
parenting coordinator.
Um, number 11 of Rule 16(1) deals - deals with the issue as well. And
um, I - - I find that uh, even though the specific powers and duties
were not outlined uh, um, that did undertake uh, efforts to try to
assist the parties in resolving some of their disputes. It was not
successful, we're not paying him for being successful. But we're
paying him for his time and his effort^?^

-

-

-

Obviously the magistrate's analysis is flawed and his refusal to follow the law is a
reversible error. In fact, the analysis above appears to be substantially similar to a
different issue in a recently decided family law case, Hopper v. Hopper, 144 Idaho 624,

In this case the father's equal rights were prejudiced by the mother
absconding with the child in violation of I.C. 8 18-4506 and obtaining
an unfounded domestic violence order in Montana restricting the
father's ability to maintain a relationship with his child. Glossing over
these facts and going to the end result that the mother has a greater
relationship with the child than the father creates an untenable
condition. If permitted to stand, the lesson from this case is that the
law may be disregarded, a crime committed, falsehoods told, and
advantage gained from the misconduct. The proceedings should not
have been allowed to continue for the duration with the mother
holding the child out of state while gaining all of the evidentiary
benefits of an enhanced relationship with that child to the detriment
of the father.
Page 156, lines 17- 25 and page 157, lines 1 - 23 of Exhibit 1 to Appellant's StatemenUAffidavit in
Support of Motion for Augmentation of Appellate Record.
94
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As in the Hopper case above, it appears the magistrate court believed that
payment of the Parenting Coordinator outweighed the need to follow the law.

If

permitted to stand, a lesson from this case is that the Parenting Coordinator can do
anything he or she wishes (and get full payment for any and all "services") whether it
violates the order of appointment, LC. Section 32-717D andor I.R.C.P. 16(1).

CONCLUSION -RELIEF SOUGHT

The trial court's decision to issue a judgment in favor of the former courtappointed Parenting Coordinator was in contradiction of Idaho law, the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure and was clearly erroneous. Father requests that the magistrate court's
ruling be reversed and the judgment against Father relating to the June 5, 2006 Order to
Show Cause HearingIMotion to Determine Fees hearing be vacated.

The former

Parenting Coordinator took part in ultra vires acts that violated the trial court's order of
appointment, Idaho Code Section 32-7171) and/or I.R.C.P. 16(1).

The Parenting

Coordinator must refund any moneys paid by Father since the Parenting Coordinator
could not exercise any powers (and therefore could not bill for any "services" provided).
The orderljudgment in favor of the Parenting Coordinator against Father be
stricken/deleted!voided.

In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the magistrate court
decisionljudgment be vacated and the proceedings be remanded and reheardltried.
Father requests any and all costs allowed a pro se litigant under Idaho law
pursuant to I.A.R. 40 on this appeal.
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